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Abstract: The paper discusses mandatory funded pensions seen as a novelty of the 
first wave of "paradigmatic" pension reforms in emerging market economies and 
as an institutional device in the very centre of the recent post-2008 change. Evi-
dence from Poland is examined in the context of the pension reform engineering. 
The central question is for whose welfare or benefit the open pension funds (OFEs) 
were introduced and why they have been scaled down recently. The perspective 
taken here is to explain the processes through reconstruction of major interests 
involved. Under the assumption that the state is the main force at play, the eco-
nomic and political interests of this party are reconstructed and discussed. The 
proposition that rising deficits and debts within general government sector provid-
ed stimuli for both rise and decline of the OFEs is the very start of the diagnosis. 
The paper argues that apart from the undesirable outcome of current debt account-
ing there were fundamental reasons of strategic nature for which government lost 
its positive interest in the OFEs as an institutional (that is long-run) device. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the course of the 1990s a number of middle-income countries intro-
duced a novelty into their pension systems, which was mandatory funded 
pillar.  In Poland it meant introduction of an utterly new regime aside of 
financing on PAYG basis. Capital funded pension schemes1 introduced 
financial logic to where principle of social insurance had ruled. They creat-
ed new business opportunities for private companies in the traditionally 
public domain. This new area of activity of private financial agents was 
supplied by state's enforcement with respect to fund raising since govern-
ments mandate individuals to participate in the funded pension schemes. 
The post-2008 financial crisis triggered a policy reversal in this respect. 
The second wave of reforms in Poland has focused on down-scaling man-
datory funded pension schemes along with cutting down transfers to this 
pillar from the general government.     
Mandatory funded pensions are examined here according to evidence 
from Poland. This institutional arrangement seems to focus major paths of 
the first wave of pension reforms, and its decline is in the centre of the se-
cond post-2008 wave. The central question is for whose welfare or benefit 
were the open pension funds (OFEs) introduced and why they have been 
scaled down recently. There are three parties at least involved in rise and 
decline of mandatory pension funds (called OFEs in Poland): the state as an 
agent of enforcement, would-be pensioners as contributors and financial 
companies as actual investors of funds. Under the assumption that the state 
is the major player, economic and political interests of this party are recon-
structed and discussed. The question how the rise of OFEs and the later 
turnabout affected the economic interests of other parties has been left for 
further research. For reasons of space the paper deliberately ignores other 
group interests involved like labour unions and employers representations, 
representations of finance industry, regulators and official supervisors as 
well as external pressures. 
 
 
Methods and Contents of the Article 
 
In the research the approach of institutional and political economy has been 
applied. The perspective taken here is to explain processes through recon-
struction of major interests involved.  The leading question is: for whose 
sake were the reforms introduced and why were they reversed? Asking this, 
                                                          
1
 Funded pensions use an accumulated fund built from contributions by or on behalf of 
its participants. Fully-funded pensions pay all of benefits from accumulated funds (Barr & 
Diamond, 2009). 
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the paper focuses on specific institutional arrangement and crucial interests 
already mentioned. 
The method relies on orderly analysis which is founded on a review of  
the literature relevant to the subject and is carried on as follows. First, the 
new arrangement is presented in the context of the pension reform engi-
neering in emerging market economies at the turn of the XX and XXI cen-
turies (the next section). Four paths of change are identified, namely a shift 
in the formula for calculating pensions from Defined Benefit (DB) to De-
fined Contribution (DC), expansion of capital funded pension schemes, 
privatization of fund-management and introduction of individual accounts. 
Next, it is argued that mandatory funded pension schemes seem to focus 
three of those paths, and regulatory post-1999 framework in Poland in this 
respect is presented. The same section reports how this set of rules was 
changed as a result of the 2013-turnabout. The final section discusses rising 
deficits and debts within general government sector as a crucial stimulus 
for change in institutional design of the OFEs. It aims to show that policy 
rationale for institutional change under examination contained inter alia the 
solution to implicit-pension-debt problem as well as stimuli for economic 
growth (and for consequent budget revenues) via development of financial 
markets. 
 
 
What were the pension reforms about? 
 
Talking about pension reforms considers two waves of major change: at 
turn of the millenium and in 2008 and beyond. The first wave refers  to 
deep, "paradigmatic" reforms in the less developed countries, and to the so-
called “parametric” reforms of pension systems in the developed market 
economies in Europe which did not radically change the paradigm of old-
age income security.   
During the 1990s and early 2000s a variety of pension reforms was in-
troduced in a number of Latin American as well as Eastern European econ-
omies under transition. As the International Labour Organization reports 
(Sarfati & Ghellab, 2012, p. 15) "[f]ollowing  the Chilean reform, 11 more 
countries in Latin America included mandatory savings tiers in their pen-
sion systems. The first wave of such systemic paradigmatic reforms in Lat-
in America was followed by reforms in 13 countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine. These countries im-
plemented multi-tier systems that were essentially scaled-down versions of 
the Latin American reforms." Then the report states that "[t]he crisis of 
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2008 and beyond has led to new developments in the history of pension 
reform." Some Latin American countries have either effectively reversed 
their reforms (Argentina, Bolivia) or accommodated them by transfers of 
public money (Chile, noncontributory universal pension). In a substantial 
number of Central and Eastern-European countries new wave of reforms 
meant the down-scaling of the private tier of their pension systems (e.g. 
Poland), even up to extinction of open pension funds  (Hungary). 
In order to make clear what the reforms were about and what idea of 
mandatory savings tiers meant, in fact, basic information on pension system 
engineering must be introduced. The core idea of designing pensions is 
security which is provided by an income (pension) to be paid to a person 
when in the retirement age. This income can be secured through variety of 
schemes and plans for employees and/or citizens. These can be in essence 
savings plans like Singapore’s publicly administered provident fund. These 
can be also public noncontributory funds where  a universal pension is 
based on years of residence (Barr & Diamond, 2009, p. 2). However, the 
most widespread scheme for financing pensions, in Europe and Americas at 
least, is insurance where a benefit is conditioned on a contribution.  
Since  Bismarck's and Beveridge's times the state became involved in 
the pension schemes with its power to impose either taxes or contributions, 
and the funds raised were traditionally managed by state's agencies in order 
to benefit retired people. Since then a core financing of pensions is carried 
out on mandatory basis. In some countries, state guarantees of minimal 
amount of pension were introduced. 
As far as old-age-insurance concerned the financing can be founded on 
current contributions (Pay-as-you-go pensions) or on accumulated funds 
(Funded pensions). Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions are paid out of current 
revenue that comes, basically, from contributions to the system made by the 
actually employed (the would-be-pensioners). Funded pensions are fi-
nanced from investment outcomes of funds accumulated due to contribu-
tions of or on behalf of their participants, and no redistribution between 
current contributors and current beneficiaries is in place. Usually, a mix of 
public PAYG and funded systems is in operation. According to Barr and 
Diamond's record (2009, p. 16), there are systems with substantial reliance 
on funding (Chile, Sweden), others with intermediate reliance on funding 
(the United States), and others operating mainly on a PAYG basis (France, 
Germany, Italy). 
The basic relation in insurance industry is the one between contribution 
and benefit, which can be designed in two different ways. According to 
defined-benefit (DB) formula the benefit does not directly depend on the 
amount of assets accumulated on behalf of a person. The formula may be 
based on the worker’s wages that is on final wage and length of service, or 
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on wages over a longer period under the course of the worker’s career. It 
indicates liabilities with respect to the person retired, and funds are adjusted 
to meet these liabilities. In effect, the risk of varying rates of return to pen-
sion assets falls on the sponsor, that is normally on the state budget. Such 
rules have been recently maintained in some European countries (Switzer-
land, Netherlands, Iceland) (Impavido & Tower, 2009, p. 12). Defined-
contribution (DC) plan seems to be a reverse to DB scheme in the sense it 
adjusts liabilities to match available funds. Namely, the benefit is deter-
mined by the amount of assets accumulated toward a person’s pension. 
Thus, this is an individual participant of the scheme to face the investment 
risk. 
With concern to the risk that arises due to varying rates of return on 
pension assets the schemes may be enriched by arrangements that increase 
their accountability. Personal records when introduced into PAYG segment 
improve accountability in the sense they enable counting pension debt and 
make liabilities of the system to would-be pensioners explicit (Rutecka, 
2014, p. 5). It is possible to have funding without individual accounts, for 
example through a central trust fund, like in Sweden or Canada. However, 
in some societies the old-age insurance system may be considered more 
liable if pension savings are recorded on personal accounts.  
Having these options in mind, one becomes convinced that there is no 
universal design for pension schemes. Multiple combinations can be made 
as far as formula of calculation (DB pensions/DC pensions) and financing 
(PAYG/funded/partially funded) as well as recording (central trust/indi-
vidual accounts) concerned. Nicholas Barr argues that this peculiar engi-
neering must not ignore the level of socio-economic development. There is 
no universal receipt; different combinations suit best the low-income, me-
dium-income and high-income countries. Social development, values and 
preferences constitute additional variables in this "modeling" on different 
levels of income. 
Public choices concerning the new in pension industry have revealed, 
however, quite clear trends. The 1990s and early 2000s have seen reforms 
which drive old-age insurance systems along four rather distinct paths.  The 
first major change refers to formula for calculating pensions. There has 
been a mass  shift  from DB rule to DC formula. This obviously means 
a relief to insurers by shifting  the consequences of varying rates of return 
on pension assets away from insurer to the insured individuals.  
Another trend observed refers to the mode of financing. Last decades 
have seen an expansion of funded pension schemes. To be more precise, 
they have been extended in the developed countries where they had already 
operated on voluntary basis, and they have been developed "green field" in 
the countries under transition. The "parametric" reforms in developed coun-
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tries promoted voluntary old-age insurance through tax privileges and 
friendly regulation. The less developed countries mentioned above, howev-
er, restructured their pension sectors fundamentally. Transition economies 
of Eastern Europe introduced voluntary funded schemes which were hardly 
new in the developed countries of Europe and North America. Moreover, 
open pension funds emerged due to transfers of a portion of contribution 
collected by state agency to private managing firms.  
Since funding is normally managed by private companies, this change 
means advance in privatisation of the pension industry. In countries which 
introduced mandatory funded pensions financial companies engaged in 
open pension funds could enjoy contributions being enforced by the state 
apparatus. Thus the states have invited private firms into the area which 
traditionally was a domain of state compulsion and was managed by public 
agencies.  
 Finally, rising popularity of individual accounts can be counted as the 
fourth path of the reform.  Thus the basic change in effect of early pension 
reforms consisted in: 
– shifting from Defined Benefit formula to Defined Contribution or No-
tional Defined Contribution (NDC) formula 
– introducing pension funding (mandatory funding included)  
– introducing individual financial accounts in public pension insurance 
– privatisation of the  pension industry 
 
 
Institutional design of mandatory  
funded pensions in Poland 
 
Accordingly, in result of pension reform of 1999 in Poland there was a shift 
from Defined Benefit formula to Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) 
formula which means a person’s pension bearing a quasi-actuarial relation-
ship to his or her lifetime pension contributions with pensions financed on 
a pay-as-you-go or/and funded basis (Barr & Diamond, 2009). Introduction 
of the new formula which meant inter alia that public funds are no more to 
be adjusted to meet liabilities was of core significance to the reduction of 
public pension system deficit. On the other hand, it caused an average ben-
efit related to average wage to decrease dramatically. In the face of this 
political problem introduction of funding might be presented to the voters 
as a novelty in financing pensions which brings "security due to diversity" 
(UNFE, 2000). Then, since 1999 a contribution to mandatory pension in-
surance used to be divided between the publicly managed pension fund 
FUS and one of the privately managed open pension funds (OFEs). Apart 
of mandatory contributions to open pension funds a voluntary old-age in-
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surance has been allowed, which makes separate funds (PPEs, IKE/IKZEs). 
Table 1 presents the "three-pillar" structure of the pension industry in Po-
land that resulted from the reform. In sum, the Polish government while 
maintaining the pillar financed on participatory basis (PAYG) supported 
pensions funded both on voluntary and mandatory basis. Funding became 
fully privatised in the sense of management. The OFEs are managed by 
licensed companies named Powszechne Towarzystwa Emerytalne (PTEs). 
These were established by a number of banks and insurers, most of them 
being foreign subsidiaries. The employers' pension schemes (PPEs) as well 
as pension funds made of voluntary contributions (IKE/IKZEs) are man-
aged by private companies (TFIs) as well. Finally, after the reform infor-
mation on liabilities within the system is stored on individual financial ac-
counts. 
 
 
Table 1. Old-age insurance in Poland as outcome of the reform of 1999 
  
Pillar I II III 
contribution (as 
percentage of wage) 
12,22 7,30 * as contracted 
mandatory voluntary 
funds FUS (reformed) OFE PPE, IKE/IKZE 
individual accounts, 
official valorization 
individual accounts, 
financial investment 
yield 
individual accounts, 
financial investment 
yield 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) 
management  Public agency - ZUS Private companies - 
PTE 
Private companies - 
TFI 
financing  Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) 
Fully funded Fully funded 
pensions ZUS ZUS**  
basic premium 
* The share was reduced to 3,5% in 2011 r. and to 2,92% in 2013. 
**According to the law of 2013 ZUS is in charge of paying out the annuities from both pillars. 
 
Source: developed by the author. 
  
Mandatory funded pillar ("the second pillar") is linked to the public 
agency managing the PAYG ("the first pillar") in two ways. Namely, ZUS 
collects contributions and makes transfers in due portions to the OFEs. 
However, the agency is not in power to supervise the OFEs' segment which 
used to be under control of a specialized bureau UNFE and now is under 
supervision of the financial sector regulator KNF. 
The OFEs' segment has consisted of ca 16 million participants on oblig-
atory basis which makes it central for pension funding in Poland whereas 
funded voluntary pension plans count 1.65 million participants in PPEs and 
IKE/IKZE. The "market" consists of  14 open pension funds (number re-
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duced from 17 in result of mergers and acquisitions), with 3 of them hold-
ing assets that make nearly 60 percentage share (Oręziak, 2014, p. 291, 
Table 9).  
The participants in the segment have been charged three kinds of fees: 
"transaction cost-covering" fee, "transfer-costs" fee and "administrative 
commission" due for fund-management. The first fee is a percentage of 
a monthly participant's contribution set at extremely high level of 10% at 
the start which even after several reductions (from 7% in 1999–2009 to 
recent 1.75%) still remains high by international standards2. Due to these 
generous fees allowed by law the PTEs seemed  not to be subject to strin-
gent calculus of operational costs. Those were costs of marketing cam-
paigns with army of agents engaged (450 thousand at the peak) as well as 
wages of PTEs' employees with wages of executives reaching a 13-fold of 
an average in Poland. So called transfer fee was to be paid by a member 
whenever he or she shifted between the OFEs, which was a punishment for 
non-loyal customer in fact (recently abolished). And finally, management 
commission was set as a percentage of assets accumulated by the OFE 
ranging from 0,045% at the start, and between 0,54% and 0,276% annum 
recently. Thus basically fund-managing companies are rewarded propor-
tionately to assets accumulated in the OFEs rather than to profits made on 
investment. At the end of the day, this is the number of participants in the 
OFE that matter for the PTEs. 
Rewarding and punishment was tied to the very specific reference in-
dex. Namely, OFEs were ranked according to the  so called rate of return, 
which measured the dynamics of so called accounting unit in a given time 
interval. In other words, it showed at the end of a quarter how much the 
capital valued in accounting units has changed since the beginning of the 
period. An average rate of return for whole population of OFEs constituted 
an inner benchmark. Punishment came only when OFE's individual rate of 
return on assets was lower than the halved average. The rule of the game 
said that in the event the fund's rate did not reach this minimum the fund-
managing company had to shift their own money to the open pension fund. 
On the other hand, those OFEs with indices higher than average were re-
warded with a premium which was characteristic of "OFE market". Name-
ly, they could expect extra rise in the number of contributors since those 
young people who made no declaration concerning their choice of OFE 
would be randomly ordered just to those funds (Pater, 2002). The PTEs did 
not risk dramatic deterioration in ranking either took no financial risk as 
                                                          
2
 In Sweden the fee from open-pension-fund-participants was in average 0.32% (2010). 
Retrieved from  https://secure.pensionsmyndigheten.se/JamforFonderFondsok.ht 
ml?url=1860026889%2FSirius%2FfundSuperSearchUpdateFundList.action&sv.url=12.70e5
6c27145a7fdc9582ec76. 
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long as their investment strategies followed those who managed the leading 
funds. Namely, due to concentration of assets in three largest funds the 
reference index depended mostly on indices of theirs. Completing similar 
investment portfolio provided  a guarantee for managers of smaller funds 
that their funds' rates would not differ dramatically from those of the lead-
ers that is  from the average. Such arrangement made bankruptcy of a PTE 
practically impossible once it followed the leaders of the "market", and 
implied herding in PTEs' investment strategies (MPPS&MF, 2013, p. 50; 
Szczurek, 2001). 
Thus, the competitive strategy of managing companies instead of inno-
vative investing focused rather on marketing as well as on developing the 
network of agents useful to acquire new members. The "pool" of customers 
has been provided automatically by the system since joining one of the 
OFEs was obligatory3, and there was no legal exit from the system. The 
game among PTEs went on about how this given pool might be distributed 
between individual OFEs. The less direct way of  competing for contribu-
tors has led via "rates of return": the more significant increase in the index 
the more appealing the fund. The direct method was a simple acquisition of 
smaller OFEs together with their participants, as it happened for instance in 
the early 2000s. This process of concentration seems to be controversial in 
the sense it has aggravated oligopolistic bias and made the relation of pow-
er between the largest OFEs and their managing companies versus their 
regulators more uneven. Another way to increase the number of contribu-
tors was advertisement campaigns via public media or direct marketing, 
and individual acquisition activities carried on by commercial agents who 
used to address participants of other OFEs as well as young people entering 
labour market when they were about to declare their membership in one of 
the pension funds. It turned out to be an extremely costly and rather inef-
fective way.  
Such engineering made PTEs' business rather safe with investment risk 
shifted on to participants in the OFEs. There is no insurance against the loss 
of assets trusted to OFEs and managed by the PTEs. Due to lack of such 
protection, the negative consequences of shifting risk to the insured under 
the DC formula for calculating pensions are even stronger. Participants can 
see an OFEs' part of their contributions vanishing as it did happen in years 
of falling security prices, with no compensation from fund-managing com-
panies. In the event when a pension from an open fund added to a pension 
from PAYG pillar  after time of contributing to the system required make 
a sum below level officially considered to be a minimum Polish state takes 
                                                          
3
 An exception was made at the very start of the reform, and one age-cohort of working 
population was free not to join the system. 
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the financial consequences subsidizing then the pension up to this minimal 
level (minimum pension guarantee). 
However, apart from using state compulsion for the sake of contribution 
collecting and from using public resources to make guarantees just men-
tioned, the government put constraints on the investment strategies of the 
PTEs through a number of strict regulations. Namely, there were ceilings 
imposed on the shares in the OFEs' portfolios of assets with reference to 
share-holdings (40%) and  foreign securities (5%). Moreover, the OFEs 
were allowed to purchase no more than 10% of equity of an individual 
company (Rozłucki, 2001, p. 38). 
   A breakthrough came with the law of December 2013 (Ustawa 2013). 
Contributing to OFE is mandatory no more, and those participants who still 
wish to contribute to an open pension fund can declare only 2,92 of their 
wage to be transferred to the fund. Thus OFEs find themselves scaled down 
both in terms of their share in mandatory pension segment and in terms of 
number of participants. Namely, few are expected to stay with OFE (the 
deadline for decision-making is end of July 2014) since to accomplish this 
an active attitude is required whereas commercial agents activities became 
forbidden. In the event no declaration of insured person has been made his 
or her contribution remains under management of ZUS, undivided. 
As far as accumulated assets concerned the OFEs were scaled down by 
half due to obligatory transfer of treasury bonds and publicly guaranteed 
securities from their portfolios to a special account under ZUS manage-
ment. In result, in early February 2014 the OFEs found assets on their par-
ticipants' accounts reduced by 51.5%. On the other hand, the  Polish gov-
ernment found public debt burden significantly reduced; the ratio of public 
debt to GDP has been diminished once and for all by 9 percentage points. 
This has been an accounting effect of course. Once these assets are record-
ed by ZUS in general government sector, they become invisible to public 
debt statistics. The rest of accumulated assets, which is shares, mainly re-
mained with OFEs no matter whether pension savers declared "stay" either 
"exit". It is bound to new investment limits; namely the share-holdings 
must not be smaller than 75% of assets in 2014 with yearly limits going to 
diminish down to 15% in 2017. On the contrary, the ceilings put on finan-
cial instruments denominated in foreign currencies were raised to 10% of 
assets in 2014 and to 20% of assets in 2015. Thus,  due to the new law the 
OFEs see their assets dramatically diminished by scale and radically re-
structured. 
From the PTEs' perspective apart from apparent losses also some gains 
can be seen. They still charge fees due to holding "old" assets in shares no 
matter whether in 2014 a contributor has declared staying with OFE or not. 
While maximum fees charged on contributions were reduced to 1,75% the 
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maximum management commission charged on assets remained un-
changed. In their investment strategies the PTEs will have to adapt to ex-
ternal bench-marking. In place of internal reference index described above, 
a soft rule reminding a self-code has been introduced. The very special 
guaranteed minimal investment yield, which is the average weighted rate of 
return together with minimal rate of return has vanished. Instead, each PTE 
is free to point reference indices of their own to be used as a bench-mark to 
the rates of return of "their" OFE. Hardly for two years, that is up to July 
2016, the supervisory agency will be involved in comparing OFEs' every-
day individual rates of return with an external bench-mark, which is a mix 
of stock exchange index and three-month inter-bank interest rate per annum 
(Rutecka, 2014, p. 3). Last but not least, PTEs enjoy lifted ceilings on fi-
nancial instruments denominated in foreign currencies mentioned above 
which they have lobbied for since the very start of the reform (Rozłucki, 
2001, p. 38) 
The recent policy reversal with respect to mandatory funded pensions 
must be seen as a struggle to constrain public deficits and debts rather than 
a battle against privileges of the group interests of the fund-managing fi-
nancial companies. The OFEs have been not eradicated, and are still hand-
somely rewarded, and are likely to become far more aggressive investors in 
capital markets, both in Warsaw and abroad. 
 
  
Comments on political economy of rise  
and decline of the OFEs 
 
For what reasons were the reforms introduced? For what reasons were the 
reforms reversed? Any policy reform to become effective either to be abol-
ished requires politics and polity. Political decisions are the consequence of 
procedures and negotiations within broad government. Under this process 
a political game with social coalitions, both those retarding and those sup-
porting change, must be played.  
Mandatory pension funding seems to involve three parties at least: the 
state, financial companies and pensioners. As a matter of fact government 
and financial sector are forces at play since would-be pensioners are no 
organized group of  interest and matter solely as voters. Policy-makers' 
positive interest in reform is rooted in public finance instability, in current 
illiquidity and implicit insolvency of the pension systems as well in aging 
of societies. The need for reform seem to have been caught as a chance by 
representatives of financial sector. The evidence from 1999–2013 in Poland 
just reported suggests that mandatory funded pensions have been intro-
duced as a result of powerful and organized support of financial interests. 
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The outcome of reconfiguration under law of 2013 suggests that they still 
do effective lobbying for their interests in pension policy. However, regard-
ing the two major players the governmental economic and ideological in-
terests seem to be pivotal as far as dynamics and orientation of reforms are 
concerned. They constitute the topic here as referred to mandatory pension 
funding. 
From the policy-making perspective, rising deficits and debts within 
general government sector were undoubtedly relevant rationale for the pen-
sion reform in Poland. At the turn of 1999 and 2000 the statistics for Poland 
revealed significant indices of public debt, pension spending and implicit 
pension debt (IPD) (Impavido & Tower, 2009, p. 41). According to the 
IMF for thirty five low and middle income countries, Poland had 3-rd larg-
est pension spending as share of GDP and 5-th largest IPD as share of GDP 
(by discount rate 2%) with public debt at that time being though relatively 
moderate (the 16-th position). Soaring public pension deficit and frustrating 
implicit pension debt required a radical change, and that has been done due 
to fundamental shift from DB to DC formula in result of the reform of 
1999. As one of the members of parliament put it, they voted for  the 
change in aim to diminish the relation between the average pension benefit 
and the average wage "since coming insolvency of the inter-generational 
system emerged from utterly all calculations based on demography"4 
(Łaski, 2010, p. 15). In result, under new pension law a relative benefit in 
average decreased dramatically; at the turn of the millennium, according to 
pension system authorities UNFE, a replacement rate was estimated at 63% 
for males and 37% for females (under extremely optimistic assumptions)5.  
As already mentioned, such policy result needed to be somehow cush-
ioned with regard to the public. Including pension funding into the reform 
seemed to be of help along with the following rationale attached. Funded 
pension schemes will possibly increase their part of pension income, im-
prove the sum of benefits originating from different pillars and effectively 
constrain a further risk of old-age poverty. Investing in capital markets is in 
the very center of such reasoning. Funds managed by financial firms are to 
be invested in stock and securities, with return on stock turnover being 
positive in the long run (Sławiński & Tymoczko, 2013; Kuczyński, 2011). 
                                                          
4
 The demography seems to be too often blamed. the change of pension rules in early 
1990s, in particular change in DB formulas resulted in impressing increase of replacement 
rates and contributed to the crisis. In average a pension benefit in Poland was worth of 78% 
of past wage of a pensioner/retiree in mid-1990s while the same relation in the Czech Re-
public and Hungary was respectively 44% and 60%, and in the top seven OECD countries it 
amounted mere 38% (UNFE, 2000, p. 11). 
5
 These are ratios for pension benefit aggregated (the first and the second pillars) pro-
vided OFEs' rate of return is 8% and wages rise at 3,5% per annum, males are 37 years in 
employment and females are 33 years in employment  (Gazeta Wyborcza, 4.03.2002) 
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This reasoning makes a multi-pillar approach for the pension system attrac-
tive thanks to the suggestion of improving rather than deteriorating the 
outcome of the system as a whole6. The official concept of "security due to 
diversity" said that a multi-tier system created more security for would-be 
pensioners. 
Alas, this reconstruction still leaves a question of having introduced 
OFEs unclear. Why apart from traditional PAYG and of a novelty of fund-
ed pensions another pillar or tier of mandatory funded pensions has been 
created? Of the two major changes which the reform brought, the shift from 
DB to DC formula was a rather direct device of improving the deficit of the 
public pension, thus alleviating the pressure on state budget deficit. This 
aspect of the reform was ultimately beneficial for the public finance (Łaski, 
2010). The move to mandatory funding, however, had immediate adverse 
effect on the current deficits. The emergence of mandatory funded pillar 
due to transfers made to the OFEs  must have aggravated the deficit of the 
public pension in ZUS-pillar and implied donations from the government 
budget, in consequence contributing to budget deficits. There was no budg-
et surplus at that time to accommodate the negative consequences of cur-
rent transfers. Why were open pension funds created then? 
We skip here the way of arguing for mandatory funded pensions that 
had wide publicity7 in order to save space for two interesting hypotheses. In 
a nutshell, the premise of implicit debt as well as promise of economic 
growth played a role. The problem of implicit pension debt in fact can be 
translated into a question how to constrain financial as well as political and 
moral responsibility for the would-be pensioners' poverty. The premise of 
growth was strongly conditioned on growth of capital which was to be of 
help in stimulating a growth of GDP and, consequently, in increasing future 
budget revenues. 
Implicit pension debt became explicit and transparent along with the in-
troduction of individual accounts both in the FUS- and OFE-pillars. IPD is 
made by sum of liabilities which the universal pension system owes to pen-
sion savers with no regard to the form of pension financing (Rutecka, 2014, 
p. 5). With individual records, it became easy to be counted. With the 
emergence of OFEs, however, this sum could be exposed as clearly divided 
between publicly managed part and privately managed part of the universal 
system of old-age insurance8. Meaning of the change might be dividing 
both administration as well as responsibility for economic performance 
                                                          
6
 Another argument extensively used said that funding in the public pension system 
made pensions free from political abuse ("political risk"), to some extent at least. 
7
 An extended arguing for mandatory funded pensions is well presented in Grabczan 
(1998). 
8
 Respectively ca 2000 in 2014 and ca 300 in 2013 (Rutecka, 2014, p. 5). 
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between public agency and private companies. More, while in the PAYG 
segment contributions loosing apparently at worth (e.g. due to inflation) 
seem politically unviable and therefore mechanisms of valorisation are set 
on, in capital segment this negative turn is a natural effect of change in 
market pricing and therefore it is much more bearable for the voters. Tak-
ing this economic-political perspective in the context of liabilities accumu-
lated in the universal pension system, one can perceive OFEs as a device of 
shifting a part of responsibility for pensioners' well-being away from the 
state. 
Still,  such political gain from funding and privatisation in old-age in-
surance can be accomplished without making pension funding mandatory. 
As a matter of fact, this is the less developed country status which seemed 
to make the policy makers in Poland to move this step further.  
The promise of growth (of financial markets at least) could not become 
true due to domestic savings which normally are low in Poland by interna-
tional standards. Mandatory pension funding meant in fact using state appa-
ratus to have relatively scarce households' savings to be transferred to fi-
nancial markets. Introducing such a rule into the pension system secured 
consequent and steady transfers of capital (liquidity), which is a great at-
traction for actors in financial markets. The price to be paid immediately 
was the explicit budget gap due to the transfers to OFEs, which increased 
deficits of the publicly managed pension fund FUS and enforce donations 
from the government budget thus contributing to fiscal deficits. 
 The latter and consequent increase in the public debt became main rea-
son for the reversal of expansion of mandatory pension funding in Poland. 
Contrary to the public pension deficit, which is no public debt, transfers of 
mandatory contributions to privately managed pension funds are regarded 
to increase the official debt (Rutecka, 2014, p. 6). According to this stance, 
confirmed with reference to the Polish case definitely by Eurostat in 2004, 
mandatory contributions to OFEs evenly with funded voluntary pension 
plans are regarded to be private money owned by fund-participants. Such 
accounting meant that transfers immanent to the second-pillar-operations 
made public debt in Poland  as related to GDP higher by a couple of per-
centage points. After having broken the EU budget deficit bench-mark, 
with the burden of public debt approaching another EU limit the govern-
ment represented by minister of finance John Vincent Rostowski said the 
cost of maintaining OFEs in terms of public debt was too high. According 
to the Ministry of Finance, if OFEs had never emerged the public debt 
would has been considerably lower as related to GDP. In 2012, for exam-
ple, it would have amounted to 38% instead of 56%, according to Eurostat 
accounting (MPPS&MF, 2013, p. 25). That was the direct reason why the 
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government scaled the open funds down  since 20099 and has radically 
changed the deal with the PTEs in 2013.  
As argued above, it might be assumed that privatisation and funding at-
tributed to OFEs would dilute implicit debt and the state's sole responsibil-
ity for yields of the system. Such speculations, if ever true, seem to get 
abandoned since the law of 2013 definitely has taken any implicit responsi-
bility in this respect back from the OFEs; in mandatory segment of the pen-
sion insurance benefits are to be paid out by the public agency ZUS in prac-
tice on PAYG basis. 
From the perspective of 2013 expectations regarding the question of 
growth of financial markets (and eventually of GDP) with OFEs as im-
portant actors turned out to be exaggerated either. As far as the volume of 
trade, success seems to be moderate and means for securities markets com-
fort rather than scales10. It is true that transferring contributions to the OFEs 
generate steady and certain inflow of funds into Warsaw Stock Exchange 
(GPW). However, OFEs' shares in trade in the GPW in 2010-2012 was 
a mere 6%. The share in free float of stock was considerably higher (26,5% 
in April 2013), however it appears disappointing when compared with early 
forecasts (70% about/around 2005 – Rozłucki, 2001, ex. 6, p. 40). This 
means that liquidity in capital markets is due not that much to open pension 
funds but to individual and foreign investors. (Sławiński & Tymoczko, 
2013). Thus, institution of OFE after 15 years in operation seems to be no 
powerful vehicle transferring household savings to capital markets. 
When speaking of the "growth effect" it is worth making a reference to 
a recently exploited argument that OFEs are relevant portfolio investors to 
non-financial companies. Open pension funds as stock holders seem to be 
important solely to big public companies registered in GPW. In the face of 
scarce capital and lack of domestic institutional investors with long-term 
perspective, they might be rather important for the privatisation process of 
big state-owned enterprises as new portfolio investors (Capital Strategy, 
2013, p. 21). The introduction of open pension funds provided companies 
registered in Warsaw Stock Exchange with some additional equity. The 
OFEs purchased stock in ca 250 public  companies being, however, limited 
by a ceiling to share-holdings amounting to 10% of equity of an individual 
company. The rest of  ca 3000 thousand firms active in the national econo-
my had no such chance (Oręziak, 2014b). Sometimes the OFEs are present-
ed as share-holders who are ready for active governance (Capital Strategy, 
                                                          
9
 There were reductions in fees in 2009 as well as in portions contributed to the OFEs in 
2011. 
10
 It does not mean we ignore the aspect of development of new institutional arrange-
ments due to OFEs which used to be exposed (Grabczan, 1998; Rozłucki 2001, p. 38) and is 
still regarded as relevant (Belka, 2011). However, we skip it here for reasons of space. 
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2013, p. 21). This view, however,  seems to be in contradiction to observa-
tion that OFEs change the structure of their portfolios quite often as com-
pared to other investors (Rozłucki, 2001, p. 39). They are apparently loose-
ly engaged in fates of the companies whose stock they hold. Consequently, 
reasoning that OFEs contributed to growth of domestic product along these 
lines seems to be risky. 
The argumentation in this section said that the government as a major 
player was interested in alleviating implicit and explicit burden of deficits 
and debts in general government sector. Therefore, and for many other 
reasons which were ignored here, it has interest in a growth of economic 
performance; in Poland under transition to fully-fledged market economy 
especially development of financial markets as well as rules inviting for 
foreign capital inflows gained in prominence. At turn of the millenium 
OFEs could have been perceived as a helpful institutional device in these 
respects. However, the speculations turned out to be exaggerated, and ex-
plicit public debt issue became  a first-hand reason for the recent policy 
reversal. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Poland was in the group of emerging market economies where at turn of the 
millennium paradigmatic pension reforms introduced an exceptional insti-
tutional device, namely mandatory funded pensions. The Polish govern-
ment like others got exposed to persuasion of the World Bank and got in-
spired by argumentation for this very special form of pension financing. 
The rising implicit pension debt seemed to comprise a real threat then, and 
the issue of rising burden of responsibility for solvency of the public pen-
sion system was heavily exploited. The recent turnabout in Poland suggests 
that liabilities in the universal mandatory system which rise with no regard 
to the form of financing must be finally met by the state even if private 
managing companies have been invited into mandatory insurance. The 
argument of growth of financial markets (and eventually of GDP) with 
open pension funds as important actors seemed to be of special significance 
for an emerging market economy like Poland's. However, it lost in rele-
vance as confronted with evidence of 15 years of the OFEs in operation. 
Although explicit budget deficits as well as consequent increase in public 
debt were obviously the immediate reasons for the reversal at turn of the 
first decades of XXI millennium, these lessons must be learned. Apart from 
the undesirable outcome of current debt accounting there were fundamental 
reasons of strategic nature for which government lost its interest in OFEs as 
an institutional (that is long-run) device. The current second wave of the 
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pension reforms should be seen as result of shifts in the set of institutional 
and economic interests. 
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